In the espionage services, the pressure from those above, from the offices, so that those below, the people of the field, are able to discover matters of formidable interest that allow them to continue in their positions, or to take the praise and rise , usually has irreparable consequences. We have seen it in movies, including some adaptations of classics by John le Carré and Graham Greene, and we also know it from real life, where the case of the Iraqi Rafid Alwan becomes the most recent paradigm: an engineer who came to Germany as a refugee and who, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the intention of staying in the country and obtaining a privileged regime, began to speak to the German secret services about the biological weapons of mass destruction of the Saddam regime Hussein. With hardly any data.
When the 9/11 attacks took place shortly after, the concatenation of tragic events, wounded egos, strategic interests, and the need for a counterattack ended up leading that little hoax, that of a man in search of the western paradise, to the great hoax of the invasion of Iraq. The german movie War of lies Directed and co-written by Johannes Naber, it gives an account of the process. A more interesting work because of what it reveals to the general public than because of the intrinsic quality of the product, which at certain times seems overwhelmed by the real ridiculousness of the process, difficult to narrate in a serious tone because its elements have a lot of absurdity, and on all for a final stretch of pure action somewhat delirious.
Cold and flat in its staging, of a conventional television series, War of lies it is sustained, however, for a good part of the story thanks to the evident interest of the conflict, to the archival images – with Colin Powell and Joschka Fischer bogged down in the great troll before the United Nations -, and to the portrait of the most attractive character in history: the of a German scientist, an expert in biological weapons, who had spent three years in Iraq looking for what Saddam was feared to have without finding anything, who is tasked with interrogations and liaison with the Iraqi chemist. That is to say, the archetype of a wise man of knowledge, but ignorant in political and strategic matters, who is managed by the commanders as appropriate. The usual useful fool.